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I. INTRODUCTION

It is almost universally recognized that the Bankruptcy Code's
protection for consumers is justifiable under the theory that an
''entrepreneurial economy prospers when honest but unfortunate
257
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debtors are given a fresh opportunity to swim back into the productive
mainstream rather than being forced down to drown."1 The amount of
protection the Bankruptcy Code (hereinafter, the "Code") should afford
consumers, on the other hand, is a source of much disagreement.
Long-standing debate over this issue was, in fact, the basis for the
controversy surrounding the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act ("the Act") that the President signed into law
in April of 2005. The Act makes "the most substantial changes to the
Bankruptcy Code since its enactment in 1978,"' 2 and appears to be a
major victory for those who believe consumer abuse had overwhelmed
the bankruptcy process and that reform was necessary in order to
"heighten the integrity of the system and to increase the
3
accountability of debtors, creditors and their counsel."
In the midst of all of the attention over the Act, however,
commentators and politicians have in large part overlooked what the
Act did not change. Most importantly, the Act failed to address
several vital controversies surrounding Chapter 13, and these
oversights will continue to present major hurdles to bankruptcy
practitioners, 4 petitioners, and secured creditors in the coming years.
To further complicate matters, the Act severely limits the availability
of Chapter 7 to consumers, which will greatly increase the usage of
Chapter 13 and therefore compound the negative impact of
congressional inaction regarding these Chapter 13 ambiguities.
The Chapter 13 process itself, however, will largely operate as
it did under previous bankruptcy law. It will continue to permit the
debtor to retain assets even if they are pledged as collateral, and as
long as the debtor can provide the corresponding secured creditor with
the equivalent of its allowed secured claim, the creditor's consent
1.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R.
333 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 183 (2001) (statement of Ralph R.
Mabey), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/107th/71179.pdf; see Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 46 (1986) (stating that the bankruptcy process is "intended to relieve an
honest and unfortunate debtor of his debts and to permit him to begin his financial life anew"
(quoting State v. Mosesson, 356 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (1974) (citations omitted in original))).
2.
HoN. WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN & LAWRENCE AHERN III, 2005 BANKRUPTCY REFORM
LEGISLATION WITH ANALYSIS 1 (2005).

3.
Clifford J. White III, Bankruptcy Reform Implementation Now Underway at the USTP,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2005, at 14, 14.
4.
See John Caher, New Law Raises Stakes for Debtors' Attorneys, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 2005,
at 1, 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1129280709784 ("Suddenly, attorneys
will be personally liable for the accuracy of their clients' petitions. They will be required to
advertise themselves as 'debt relief agencies.' They will be barred from telling clients certain
pertinent information, such as the fact that it is legal to incur new debt on the eve of bankruptcy.
And they will be required to give advice that some practitioners say is directly contrary to other
sections of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, potentially pitting their ethical obligations against their
legal responsibilities.").
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remains unnecessary. 5 For obvious reasons, the majority of Chapter
13 debtors do not have the cash available at the time of their
bankruptcy to pay off their secured creditors' claims in one lump sum,
so their plans typically propose repayment in the form of a three- to
five-year payment plan. 6
Furthermore, in recognition of basic
financial principles such as the time value of money and the default
risk involved in a promise of future payments, the amended Code
continues to require that the amount of each proposed payment be
calibrated so that the creditor will receive disbursements with a
present value equal to that of its secured claim at the time of the
petition. 7
This present value calibration will continue to be
effectuated using a discount rate8 proposed by the debtor, which the
court must approve in order to confirm the plan. 9
The Code itself has never specified how the discount rate
should be calculated, 10 and the Act failed to resolve or even address
this highly controversial issue.
As a result of this spoiled
congressional opportunity, this crucial concept remains a matter of
case law. Of course, despite Congress's inaction, one would expect
that the sheer number of Chapter 13 cases that arise on a yearly
basis would have required that courts establish a uniform method
for calculating this rate long ago. However, in the pre-Act case of Till
v. SCS Credit Corp., the Supreme Court acknowledged that various
lower courts were using four distinct methods of conducting the
Chapter 13 present value analysis1 2 and ostensibly granted certiorari

5.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (2006) (listing the requirements for confirmation of what is
known as a "cram down" plan).
6.
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 469 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Plans
that invoke the cramdown power often provide for installment payments over a period of years
rather than a single payment.").
7.
Id. (stating that "each installment [payment] must be calibrated to ensure that... the
creditor receives disbursements whose total present value equals or exceeds that of the allowed
claim").
8. While there are some conceptual differences between the two terms, "interest rate" and
"discount rate" are used interchangeably throughout this Note.
9.
See Till, 541 U.S. at 472 n.8 (noting that the court's review of the discount rate is part of
its determination of whether the plan is financially feasible).
10. See id. at 473 ("The Bankruptcy Code provides little guidance as to which of the rates of
interest advocated by the four opinions in this case-the formula rate, the coerced loan rate, the
presumptive contract rate, or the cost of funds rate-Congress had in mind when it adopted the
cramdown provision.").
11. See Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Number of Bankruptcy Cases Filed
in Federal Courts Up Less Than One Percent for 12-Month Period, Quarterly Filings up 11
Percent (Aug. 24, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/bankruptcyfilings
82405.html (noting that there were over 440,000 Chapter 13 filings in the 2005 fiscal year alone).
12. See Till, 541 U.S. at 469 (noting that "the Bankruptcy Judge, the District Court, the
Court of Appeals majority, and the dissenting Judge each endorsed a different approach").
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to clear up this lack of uniformity.13 In light of the multitude of times
this issue arose in lower courts and the rarity of the Supreme Court's
intrusions into consumer bankruptcy issues, 14 it would appear at first
glance that the Tills won the legal lottery when the Court decided to
hear their appeal from a Seventh Circuit decision. However, even a
cursory review of the proceedings makes it clear that the Tills' case
was the epitome of legal uncertainty and apparent arbitrariness, and
provided the Court with an especially compelling call to action.
The Tills' bankruptcy adventure began when they used what is
known as the "formula" or "prime-plus" approach to calculate the cram
down rate15 for their bankruptcy plan. 16 This approach generated a
discount rate of 9.5%, which the bankruptcy court confirmed. 17 The
district court, however, reversed by adopting the "coerced loan
approach," which yielded a cram down rate of 21%.18 On appeal from
the district court's decision, the Seventh Circuit employed the
"presumptive contract rate approach."' 9 While conceptually distinct
from the method used by the district court, this court also held that a
21% rate was appropriate. 20 Finally, the dissent in the Seventh
Circuit argued for the adoption of a fourth method known as the "cost
of funds approach" 2' which would have generated a discount rate in
22
the neighborhood of the 9.5% rate the Tills had proposed.

13. See id. ('The proceedings in this case that led to our grant of certiorari identified four
different methods of determining the appropriate method with which to perform [the present
value calculation]."); Thomas J. Yerbich, How Do You Count the Votes-Or Did Till Tilt the
Game?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2004, at 10, 10 ('The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve a conflict among the circuits.").
14. See Henry E. Hildebrand, TILL: Prime Plus, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, July 2004, at
8, 8 ("Rarely does the Supreme Court consider cases which immediately impact everyday
bankruptcy practice. Rarer still does the Court take up bankruptcy issues that directly involve
consumer practitioners.").
15. The term "cram down rate" refers to the rate of interest that will be used to calibrate
the stream of payments that an objecting secured creditor will receive "to ensure that, over time,
the creditor receives disbursements whose total present value equals or exceeds that of the
allowed claim." Till, 541 U.S. at 469.
16. Id. at 471.
17. Id. at 471-72.
18. Id. at 472.
19. Id. at 472-73.
20.

Id.

21. Id. at 473.
22. "Strictly speaking, the debtor's retention of the collateral does not preclude the creditor
from making a new loan, it simply deprives the creditor of an asset that the creditor could
convert into money and use to fund the new loan. A straightforward way to account for that
deprivation is to ask what it would cost the creditor to obtain the cash equivalent of the collateral
from an alternative source." In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
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By the time the Tills' case reached the Supreme Court, the
23
Justices had a "virtual smorgasbord of options from which to choose."
To the dismay of secured creditors everywhere, 24 the opinion written
by Justice Stevens, which became that of the plurality, adopted the
formula method. 2 The four-Justice dissenting opinion authored by
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, endorsed the presumptive contract
rate approach. 26 Complicating matters significantly, Justice Thomas
concurred in the judgment of the plurality but seriously called into
question the usefulness of the Till opinion by arguing that secured
creditors are entitled to nothing more than the risk-free rate of
interest, thereby creating a fifth method of calculating cram down
rates. 27 The problem for lower courts applying Till is that Justice
Thomas simply concurred with the method that in the Tills' situation
28
yielded the cram down rate closest to the risk-free rate of interest.
As a result, since there are conceivable situations where the formula
approach would yield a rate higher than the presumptive contract rate
approach, 29 it appears that if this issue reached the Supreme Court
again, the dissent and plurality might swap roles. 30 Additionally, the
recent changes in the composition of the Court only add to the
31
uncertainty surrounding the stability of the Till decision.
In the minds of many, the Court's four-four-one decision in Till
squandered a "marvelous opportunity to impose some much-needed
order and predictability" as to which of the approaches for calculating
23. Yerbich, supranote 13, at 10.
24. See Clyde Mitchell, High Court Takes Interest in 'Cramming Down' Banks, N.Y.L.J.,
July 14, 2004, at 3, 3, available at http://www.whitecase.com/publications/detail.aspx?id=880
d930b-58b6-46f3-93c3-1914f4427e47 (explaining that Till "has far reaching implications for
banks acting as secured lenders in cases arising under the 'cramdown' provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code"); Dennis J. Connolly, High Court Cram-Down Decision Will Have Big Impact,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 2004, at 20, 20 (predicting that the "4-1-4 plurality decision" will have "farreaching economic consequences for subprime lenders and secured creditors generally").
25. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479-80 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
("[Tihe prime-plus or formula rate best comports with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.").
26. Id. at 491-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 488 (Thomas, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 491.
29. For example, if the debtor at the time of the loan was a low enough credit risk to receive
an incentive interest rate on her car loan that was below the prime rate of interest, the
plurality's method would actually result in a higher rate.
30. See Till, 541 U.S. at 491 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that because "the 9.5% rate
is higher than the risk-free rate" it sufficiently compensates creditors; therefore, the judgment of
the court of appeals which resulted in a 21% rate was misguided and should be overturned).
31. Since their predecessors sided with Justice Scalia, the appointments of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito will probably not change the votes on the Till issue if it reaches the
Court again. Nevertheless, predictions as to the likelihood that either of the new Justices would
side with Justice Stevens would be extremely speculative at this point and are outside the scope
of this Note.
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32
the discount rate should be used in the Chapter 13 context.
However, in contrast to the bulk of commentary concerning this issue,
this Note does not argue Till's primary flaw was that none of the
aforementioned methods gained the support of a majority of Justices.
Instead, this Note asserts that the fundamental mistake in Till was
that the Court deliberated over which of these methods should be
adopted rather than acknowledging that they all fail to comply with
the Code. This Note argues that the inadequacies of the existing
methods result from their attempt to predict the answer to an
inherently mathematical question (the present value of a stream of
future payments) without engaging in any sort of quantitative
analysis. As a result, the methods amount to nothing more than
educated guesses and differ only by their starting points rather than
their methodology. This Note's ambition is to at least reframe the
issue so that it might eventually be resolved using objective data.
Part II of this Note provides a context for the Till issue by
briefly outlining the facts of the Till case itself and explaining what, if
anything, the Till opinion actually resolved. Part III discusses the two
approaches that appear to be viable post-Till, and explains the flaws
that prevented them from gaining the support of more than four
Justices. In a break from the previous commentary on this issue, Part
IV presents data garnered from consumer automobile loan
securitizations in an attempt to quantitatively compare loans made
outside of bankruptcy to the de facto loans created by Chapter 13 cram
down plans. Finally, Part V uses the comparisons discussed in Part
IV in an attempt to predict what the financial markets would consider
to be appropriate risk premiums for cram down plans, and goes on to
suggest ways in which the Till issue could ultimately be resolved.
Part VI concludes.

II. THE TILL PROBLEM
A. The Tills' Experience with Chapter 13
In October of 1998, Lee and Amy Till purchased a used truck
for $6,725.75 from Instant Auto Finance. 33
The purchase was
financed with a $300 down payment and a retail installment contract
34
which was eventually assigned to SCS Credit Corporation ("SCS").
32.
LETTER,
33.
34.

Ralph Brubaker, Cramdown Interest Rates: Disarray Dominates Till...
Aug. 2004, at 1, 1.
Till, 541 U.S. at 469.
Id. at 470.
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The terms of the financing included a 21% finance charge per year for
136 weeks, which amounted to a finance charge over the term of the
loan of $1,859.49. 35 The contract also provided that Instant Auto
Finance retained a purchase money security interest which was
subsequently assigned to SCS. This security interest gave the lender
36
the right to repossess the truck if the Tills defaulted.
Approximately one year after the purchase of the truck the
Tills ended up defaulting on their payments to SCS and filing a joint
petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. 37 By the
time the petition was filed the loan balance had been paid down to
about $4,900; however, both SCS and the Tills agreed that the truck
was only worth approximately $4,000.38 As a consequence, SCS's
secured claim was limited to $4,000 and the balance became an
39
unsecured claim.
The Tills' Chapter 13 plan was designed to last for three years
and provided that they would submit $740 of their wages to the
trustee each month. 40 As to SCS's claim, the plan provided that the
Tills would keep the truck by retaining SCS's lien and promising a
sufficient portion of the monthly payments to SCS. In an attempt to
compensate SCS for the fact that the promise of future payments was
worth less than a lump-sum payoff would have been, the plan
41
provided that the payments would incorporate a 9.5% interest rate.
To arrive at this rate, the Tills started with the national prime rate of
interest and added a small risk premium to account for the additional
default risk that borrowers in the Tills' financial position typically
pose. 42 SCS objected to this calculation and asserted that the
appropriate interest rate for calibrating the installment payments
under the bankruptcy plan was the contractual rate that the truck
43
had originally been subject to, which in this case was 21%.
The bankruptcy court held a hearing on SCS's objection and
eventually found that the formula approach used by the Tills was
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006) ("An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest.., is a secured claim to the extent of the value of
such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to
the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed
claim.").
40. Till, 541 U.S. at 471.
41.

Id.

42.
43.

Id.
Id.
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appropriate. 44 SCS appealed that decision to the federal district court,
which reversed, reasoning that the interest rate in this context should
be equal to "the level the creditor could have obtained if it had
foreclosed on the loan, sold the collateral, and reinvested the proceeds
in loans of equivalent duration and risk."4 5 As a result of this line of
thinking, the district court held that the 21% rate from the original
46
contract was appropriate.
The Tills appealed the district court decision to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, which endorsed a third way of calculating
the discount rate in this context. 47 The majority held that the interest
rate agreed to in the original contract should serve as the
presumptively correct discount rate, but that either party could rebut
that presumption with evidence that a different rate would be more
appropriate. 48 The court then remanded the case to the bankruptcy
court to determine whether either party could rebut the presumption
that the 21% rate should be applied. 49 The Seventh Circuit dissent
proposed a fourth method of calculating discount rates, under which
the present value calibration would use the rate that it would "cost the
creditor to obtain the cash equivalent of the collateral from an
alternative source. 50
B. Did Till Accomplish Anything?
The Tills appealed the Seventh Circuit's decision to the United
States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to resolve the split of
opinion in lower courts as to which of the four methods of calculating
cram down rates was most appropriate. Most legal observers expected
that the Court would end the controversy by endorsing one of those
methods. The Court, however, did not meet these expectations and did
little to resolve the confusion. 51
In the Till decision, Justice Stevens wrote an opinion adopting
the formula method; he was joined by Justice Souter, Justice

44. Id. at 472.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 472-73.
48. Id. at 473.
49. Id.
50. In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
51. See Brubaker, supra note 32, at 1 (noting that the Supreme Court had "a marvelous
opportunity to impose some much-needed order and predictability" and that instead of
conclusively endorsing one of the existing approaches, the Court provided little "to guide and
constrain the lower courts, aside from pre-Til circuit precedent not inconsistent with Til").
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Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. 52 This opinion became that of the
plurality because Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring
in the judgment of the Stevens group. 53 His opinion, however,
endorsed a fifth method for calculating the discount rate; he asserted
that all of the other methods overcompensated creditors because 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) does not require that the proper discount
rate in a cram down plan reflect the risk of nonpayment. 54 Finally,
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by the
remaining three Justices, and asserted that the presumptive contract
rate approach that had been applied by the Seventh Circuit was the
proper method as it actually compensated creditors for the risk that
55
they were being subjected to in Chapter 13 plans.
Although the Till decision did not clear up the confusion
surrounding the calculation of discount rates as much as many had
hoped it would, it does seem to eliminate several of the previously
used techniques as viable options. The first method rejected by the
Court was the risk-free rate approach proposed by Justice Thomas in
his concurrence. 56 Justice Thomas essentially argued that 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) does not require the courts to consider anything other
than the risk-free rate of interest:
I agree that a "promise of future payments is worth less than an immediate payment" of
the same amount, in part because of the risk of nonpayment. But this fact is irrelevant.
The statute does not require that the value of the promise to distribute property under
the plan be no less than the allowed amount of the secured creditor's claim. It requires
only that "the value.., of property to be distributed under the plan," at the time of the
effective date of the plan, be no less than the amount of the secured creditor's claim. 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). Both the plurality and the dissent ignore the clear text of the
statute in an apparent rush to ensure that secured creditors are not undercompensated
in bankruptcy proceedings. But the statute that Congress enacted does not require a
debtor-specific risk adjustment that would put secured creditors in the same position as
57
if they had made another loan.

While Thomas's distinction between the value of the promise to
distribute property and the value of the property itself could generate
interesting debate, this Note will not spend significant amounts of
time discussing it because, as Justice Thomas concedes, "[b]oth the
plurality and the dissent agree that '[a] debtor's promise of future
payments is worth less than an immediate payment of the same total
amount because the creditor cannot use the money right away,
52.
53.

Till, 541 U.S. at 467, 479-80.
Id. at 467.

54.

Id. at 485-87, 491.

55.
56.
interest
57.

Id. at 491-92.
See id. at 508 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Eight Justices are in agreement that the rate of
set forth in the debtor's approved plan must include a premium for risk.").
Id. at 485-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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inflation may cause the value of the dollar to decline before the debtor
pays, and there is always some risk of nonpayment.' 5 8 As a result, the
Supreme Court aligned eight to one in favor interpreting the cram
down provisions as requiring more than just the risk-free rate of
interest. 59
The second method eliminated by the Court was the cost of
funds approach adopted by the dissent in the Seventh Circuit
opinion.6 0 The biggest hurdle to the effectiveness of the cost of funds
approach is that this method is difficult to apply, as it would require
bankruptcy courts to conduct evidentiary hearings to determine the
lender's cost of capital. 61 In addition, it seems to disregard the fact
that creditors do not have an unlimited borrowing capacity, so the cost
to the creditor of borrowing the equivalent value of the collateral will
almost always be more than just the simple interest rate they would
be charged. 62 Finally, this approach does not seem to be consistent
with the Code itself as it focuses on the creditor 6 3 and completely
ignores the risk that the debtor could default on the interest
payments.
The final technique rejected by a majority of the Justices in Till
is the coerced loan approach. 64 In rejecting this method, the plurality
noted that it would be extremely difficult to obtain the appropriate
58. See id. at 485 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting the plurality and
dissenting opinions).
59. Id. at 483 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
[B]ecause so many judges who have considered the issue (including the authors of the
four earlier opinions in this case) have rejected the risk-free approach, we think it too
late in the day to endorse that approach now. Of course, if the text of the statute
required such an approach, that would be the end of the matter. We think, however,
that § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)'s reference to "value, as of the effective date of the plan, of
property to be distributed under the plan" is better read to incorporate all of the
commonly understood components of "present value," including any risk of
nonpayment.
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2004)).
60. See In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 593-99 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (proposing
the cost of funds approach); Brubaker, supra note 32, at 5 ("Another approach to cramdown
interest rates that seems untenable after Till is the so-called cost of funds approach.").
61. See Till, 541 U.S. at 478 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (arguing that the "cost of funds
approach imposes a significant evidentiary burden, as a debtor seeking to rebut a creditor's
asserted cost of borrowing must introduce expert testimony about the creditor's financial
condition").
62. See Brubaker, supra note 32, at 6 (arguing that a major problem with the cost of funds
approach is its unstated "assumption that the secured creditor has an unlimited supply of credit"
(quoting United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir. 1993))).
63. Till, 541 U.S. at 478.
64. See id. at 477 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (explaining the considerations that led the
plurality to "reject the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches");
id. at 491-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (adopting the contract rate approach to the exclusion of all
other methods).
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market rate of interest for a so-called "coerced loan" because there is
"no free market of willing cram down lenders." 65 Furthermore,
although much of the dissenting opinion is consistent with the
rationale behind the coerced loan approach, the main advantage of the
presumptive contract rate technique advocated by the dissent is that
the parties have already established an appropriate rate that takes
into account all of the nuances of their own situation. 66 This is an
advantage not shared by the coerced loan approach. 67 Additionally, it
is clear that Justice Thomas would reject this method because it
68
includes something beyond the risk-free rate.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE Two METHODS LEFT STANDING AFTER TILL
A. The FormulaApproach
1. Basic Operation
The formula approach to calculating discount rates endorsed by
the Till plurality takes "its cue from ordinary lending practices" by
using the national prime rate as reported daily in the press as a
starting point in the calculations. 69 Although the prime rate is
actually the financial markets' rate for the most creditworthy
commercial borrowers, 70 it is commonly used as an index for consumer
transactions (e.g., credit card rates). The prime rate of interest is a

65. Id. at 476 n.14.
66. See id. at 491-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the assumptions underlying the
presumptive contract rate approach and arguing that the contract rate "will provide a quick and
reasonably accurate standard" because that rate reflects a bargain that the parties already
entered into and therefore "is generally a good indicator of actual risk'); id. at 477 (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion) ("Mhe coerced loan approach requires bankruptcy courts to consider evidence
about the market for comparable loans to similar (though nonbankrupt) debtors-an inquiry far
removed from such courts' usual task of evaluating debtors' financial circumstances and the
feasibility of their debt adjustment plans.'); see also Brubaker, supra note 32, at 7 ("While much
of the reasoning of Till's four-justice dissent is consistent with the forced loan theory, nowhere
does that opinion expressly invoke the new loan analogy.").

67.

Id.

68. See Till, 541 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the statute at issue does
not require that the interest rate in a cram down plan reflect the risk of nonpayment, and
further asserting that in "most, if not all, cases, where the plan proposes simply a stream of cash
payments, the appropriate risk-free rate should suffice").
69. Id. at 478-79.
70. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 818 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the term "prime rate" as the
"interest rate that a commercial bank holds out as its lowest rate for a short-term loan to its
most creditworthy borrowers").
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combination of the risk free-rate 7' plus an additional 2-3% that serves
as a risk premium. 72 The risk-free portion of the rate is supposed to
compensate the lender for the opportunity cost of making the loan
(i.e., the time value of money). The risk premium portion of the prime
rate is included because of the risk that the debtor might default. This
risk, however, is relatively low for creditworthy commercial borrowers,
which is why the prime rate is only a few points higher than the
73
equivalent treasury rate.
Chapter 13 debtors pose a greater risk of nonpayment than do
creditworthy commercial borrowers, which is why the formula
74
approach augments the prime rate with an additional risk premium.
Calculating this addition to the prime rate requires the bankruptcy
court to consider factors that one would expect to influence the
likelihood that a confirmed Chapter 13 plan will succeed. 75 According
to Justice Stevens, these factors include "the circumstances of the
estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of
the reorganization plan."76 In the end, the calculation necessitates an
evidentiary hearing at which both the creditors and debtor can
77
present evidence that bears on the appropriate risk premium.
One of the noteworthy aspects of the formula approach is that
it starts from a "concededly low estimate" (the prime rate of interest)
and requires the creditor to provide evidence in order to make an
upward adjustment. 78 This has the practical effect of placing the
evidentiary burden on creditors in almost every case. 79 Justice
Stevens justified this burden-shifting by pointing out that creditors
have better access to this type of information and that the factors

71. The risk-free rate is generally represented by the treasury rates for relevant maturities.
72. The treasury rates do not include a risk premium because the market treats U.S.
government bonds as default-free.
73. Note that that the risk premium is actually composed of a premium for several different
kinds of risk, e.g., inflation risk, reinvestment risk, etc., but this discussion focuses on the
primary component of the premium which is the portion for default risk. Also note that some of
the premium is designed to cover lender transaction costs, but details about these costs are
outside the scope of this discussion.
74. See Till, 541 U.S. at 479 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("Because bankrupt debtors
typically pose a greater risk of nonpayment than solvent commercial borrowers, the approach
then requires a bankruptcy court to adjust the prime rate accordingly.").
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The burden will almost always be on the creditors because it is extremely unlikely
that the debtor could present any evidence that the appropriate rate should be lower than the
already debtor-favorable rate the court will start with.
79. Id.
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considered when calculating the appropriate risk adjustment fall
within the bankruptcy court's area of expertise.8 0
The most controversial aspect of the formula approach is
determining the proper scale for the risk adjustment. The Court in
Till approved a risk premium over the prime rate of 1.5%, and it
appears that other courts have stayed within a 1-3% window. 8 ' The
difficulty is that the rate selected must fully compensate the creditor
for the default risk in order to meet the statutory mandate that the
secured creditor receive property with a value at least equal to that of
the allowed secured claim.8 2 If the rate is too low, underestimating
the risk of the plan's failure, the secured creditor will actually receive
property that is worth less than its secured claim. However, if the rate
is too high, it might doom the plan altogether (i.e., the debtor might
not be able to afford to make the required payments and will be forced
to surrender the collateral).8 3 In the words of Justice Stevens, if the
bankruptcy court determines that the likelihood of default is "so high
as to necessitate an 'eye-popping' interest rate ... the plan probably
84
should not be confirmed."
2. The Case for the Formula Approach
One of the primary reasons Justice Stevens endorsed the
formula approach was because he believed the coerced loan,
presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches were all
seriously flawed and therefore untenable.8 5 He argued that these
approaches were "complicated, impose[d] significant evidentiary costs,
and aim[ed] to make each individual creditor whole rather than to
ensure the debtor's payments have the required present value."8' 6 In
contrast with these other approaches, the formula approach is

80.

Till, 541 U.S. at 479.

81. Id. at 480; see In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55, 64 (2nd Cir. 1997) (holding that a risk
premium "range of one to three percent is reasonable"); In re Wilmsmeyer, 171 B.R. 61, 63
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994) (adopting a cram down interest rate of prime plus 3.5% set by a local rule
that stands absent "proof to the contrary"); Connolly, supra note 24, at 20 (explaining that
although "the Stevens opinion did not decide the 'proper scale' for the risk adjustment... it did
cite to cases approving a risk adjustment (in unrelated fact patterns) of 1% to 3%").
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006) (requiring that "the value, as of the effective date
of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than
the allowed amount of such claim").
83. See Till, 541 U.S. at 480 (stating that the court is obligated to "select a rate high enough
to compensate the creditor for its risk but not so high as to doom the plan").
84. Id. at 480-81 (citation omitted).
85. See id. at 477 (listing the considerations that led to the plurality's rejection of these
methods).
86. Id.
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straightforward and uses a procedure that is familiar to the financial
markets.8 7
Furthermore, the formula approach applies objective
elements such as the national prime rate of interest, whereas the
88
other techniques require a much more subjective analysis.
Stevens was also swayed by the fact that the formula approach
"minimizes the need for potentially costly additional evidentiary
proceedings."8 9 While an evidentiary hearing will be necessary in
order to determine the appropriate risk premium under the formula
approach, the evidence that is required will, to some degree, already
be included in the debtor's bankruptcy filings. 90 Additionally, since
the components of the formula approach missing from the debtor's
filings are easily obtainable (e.g., the national prime rate of interest as
of the filing date), Stevens argued that debtors will incur
comparatively less expense than if the other methods were used. 9 1
The plurality opinion also argued that unlike the other
methods endorsed by lower courts, the formula approach does not rely
on creditors' circumstances or on prior interactions between the
creditor and the debtor. 92 These kinds of considerations do not
address the statutory mandate of making sure that the present value
of the payments to be received as part of the bankruptcy plan is equal
to the allowed secured claim. 93 In contrast, the formula approach
focuses on the state of the financial markets, the circumstances of the
94
bankruptcy estate, and the characteristics of the proposed payments.
These are all factors that, according to Justice Stevens, directly
influence the present value of the payment stream. 95
There are several other implicit reasons the plurality opinion
favored the formula approach. First, for the majority of Chapter 13
debtors, the risk premium calculated by the formula approach is
96
systematically lower than the rate produced by the other methods.
87. Id. at 478-79.
88. See id. at 479 ("[T]he formula approach entails a straightforward, familiar, and
objective inquiry, and minimizes the need for potentially costly additional evidentiary
proceedings.").
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006) (requiring that "the value, as of the effective date
of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than
the allowed amount of such claim").
94. Till, 541 U.S. at 479-80.
95. Id.
96. For example, the Court approved a 9.5% interest rate for the Tills in spite of the fact
that before they had a bankruptcy in their credit history (which negatively impacts one's credit
score) they agreed to a 21% rate. Id. at 470-71.
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In reality, most Chapter 13 debtors were considered high credit risks
before they filed for bankruptcy, and the risk they pose is not any
lower in the eyes of creditors after they seek bankruptcy protection, at
least not for the duration of the plan. 97 As a result, the methods that
incorporate the original contractual rate of the loan (e.g., the
presumptive contract rate approach), or what a creditor would now
charge a debtor in similar circumstances (e.g., the coerced loan
approach), produce a rate that is commonly two to three times larger
than the current prime rate. 98 There is little doubt that one of the
primary concerns of the plurality was that if these "eye-popping" rates
are used, very few debtors will be able to propose a feasible plan
because such a significant amount of their payments will have to go
towards interest. 99 The impact of earmarking an unfair portion of the
debtor's assets for secured creditors is significant for several reasons.
First, it would cause unsecured creditors to receive even less than they
already appear to get on average. Second, it might make Chapter 13
prohibitively expensive for some debtors that are already precluded
from using Chapter 7 by the "means test" added by the Act, which
would leave the debtor with no avenue of relief from creditor
harassment. Thus, the plurality may well have been concerned that
forcing debtors to pay such high rates of interest would effectively
negate the availability of Chapter 13 and give secured creditors more
protection than the Code demands. 10 0
Finally, the plurality seems to have endorsed the formula
approach in part because there is not enough information available to
calculate the appropriate risk premium.
In other words, the
presumptions and burdens of proof used in this method make it the
most viable of the options, even if its accuracy in any specific situation
is questionable. 10 1 In fact, the plurality opinion conceded that the rate
97. See id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Ain already bankrupt borrower has
demonstrated a financial instability and a proclivity to seek legal protection that other subprime
borrowers have not."). Note, however, that there are instances where declaring bankruptcy can
actually improve a debtor's credit risk, such as when a consumer successfully completes a
Chapter 7 proceeding and thereby eliminates all of her creditors' claims.
98. The majority of methods in use prior to Till would have yielded a rate of 21% or more,
whereas the formula approach generated a 9.5% rate. See id. at 471-73, 479-80 (acknowledging
that more than one of the lower courts held that a 21% rate was appropriate, but nevertheless
approving the 9.5% rate generated by the formula approach).
99. Id. at 480-81 (citation omitted).
100. See id. (stating that the challenge is to "select a rate high enough to compensate the
creditor for its risk but not so high as to doom the plan" and arguing that "[i]f the court
determines that the likelihood of default is so high as to necessitate an 'eye-popping' interest
rate... the plan should probably not be confirmed" in the first place) (citation omitted).
101. See id. at 480 (stating that while there "is some dispute about the true scale" of the risk
that the plan will fail, the Court "need not resolve that dispute").
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of failure for confirmed Chapter 13 plans was uncertain but claimed
that it did not need to resolve that dispute in order to decide the
case. 10 2 To anyone who was under the impression that the plurality
was "calculating" an appropriate risk premium, this statement would
be shocking. The most plausible explanation, however, is that the
Justices concluded that the true risk of failure could not be accurately
calculated using the available data. Consistent with this theory, the
plurality's endorsement of the formula approach seems to be a
declaration that the debtor should get the benefit of the doubt if the
real risk of default cannot be known.
3. Criticisms
The gravest flaw in the formula approach is that it does not
comply with the Code's mandate that secured creditors receive
property that equals or exceeds the value of their allowed secured
claims. 10 3 As the plurality opinion admits, a "debtor's promise of
future payments is worth less than an immediate payment of the
same total amount because the creditor cannot use the money right
away, inflation may cause the value of the dollar to decline before the
debtor pays, and there is always some risk of nonpayment."10 4 This
means that if the debtor's plan provides that a stream of payments
will pay off a secured claim, the payments must possess the same
present value as a lump sum pay-off.
In order for the present value of these two options to be equal,
the plan must include a rate of interest that sufficiently compensates
the creditor for the opportunity cost of waiting to be paid, the risk of
inflation over the payment period, and the risk of nonpayment. 1 5 As
a practical matter, if all confirmed Chapter 13 plans succeeded
according to schedule, the risk-free rate of interest on similar maturity
treasury bills or bonds would be sufficient to compensate the creditor
for the opportunity costs of making the loan. 106 However, as the
102. Id.
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006) (requiring that "the value, as of the effective date
of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than
the allowed amount of such claim").
104. Till, 541 U.S. at 474 (emphasis added).
105. In fact, there are other components of market risk that should be included in the
discussion if the goal is to actually simulate a market risk, e.g., reinvestment risk. While for the
most part these risks are outside the scope of this discussion, they will be discussed in more
detail in Parts IV & V, infra.
106. The plurality actually claims in footnote 18 that if the payments were certain the prime
rate alone would be sufficient, but that would actually overcompensate the creditor because the
prime rate includes a small default risk premium. Till, 541 U.S. at 479 n.18. In truth, the riskfree rate of interest does not actually compensate for inflation risk, so if there was no default risk
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plurality concedes, even though the "post[-]bankruptcy obligor is no
longer the individual debtor but the court-supervised estate," the risk
10 7
of default does not disappear and is only "somewhat reduced."
It becomes painfully obvious that the plurality either
intentionally or mistakenly understated the impact of default risk
when it declared that while there "is some dispute about the true scale
of that risk," it "need not resolve that dispute."'108 Justice Stevens
half-heartedly justified this assertion with his observation that "a
court may not approve a plan unless, after considering all of the
creditors' objections and receiving the advice of the trustee, the judge
is persuaded that 'the debtor will be able to make all payments...
and [otherwise] comply with the plan."' 0 9 While this is no doubt a
true statement, it has little to do with the risk of plan failure after the
plan has been confirmed.
In fact, the only way to know the
appropriate risk premium when using the formula approach is to have
some form of reliable estimate of both the failure rate of confirmed
plans and the expected recovery rate for creditors when a confirmed
plan fails. Without such information, the plurality's confirmation of a
1.5% risk premium lacks any substantive support.
Along with underestimating the impact of default risk for
Chapter 13 plans, the formula approach fails to meet the plurality's
own goal of creating an objective inquiry. While obtaining the current
prime rate is an objective exercise, calculating the additional risk
premium is far from objective.
As the plurality concedes, the
bankruptcy court must hold an evidentiary hearing under this
approach to evaluate subjective factors that influence the likelihood of
the plan's success. 110 In addition, the plurality mistakenly assumes
that the adjustment will always be smaller than the prime rate itself.
Certainly there could be cases in which a Chapter 13 plan appears to
have great chances of success, and in which the augmentation might
be less than the prime rate itself (e.g., the 1-3% range the plurality
notes other courts have used)."' As a practical matter however, the
average risk of plan failure appears to be very high, which means that
the risk premium would in many cases be larger than the prime rate

in confirmed Chapter 13 plans perhaps the more accurate statement would be to say that the
creditor should receive the rate currently being paid on the most analogous inflation-indexed
U.S. government bonds.
107. Id. at 475.
108. Id. at 480.
109. Id. (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 479.
111. See id. at 480 ("[O]ther courts have generally approved adjustments of 1% to 3%.").
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itself, assuming fundamental financial principles are not ignored. 112
As Justice Scalia phrased it, in many cram down proceedings the
prime rate "becomes the objective tail wagging a dog of unknown
11 3
size."
One final criticism of the Court's adoption of the formula
method is that the plurality essentially made policy when it endorsed
this approach. In most Chapter 13 cases, the amounts at stake are
relatively small in comparison to the costs of completing a detailed
risk analysis.1 1 4 Therefore, due to the costs associated with obtaining
a better rate under the formula approach, most creditors will be stuck
with little more than the prime rate of interest. In choosing to start
from a low estimate and forcing the creditor to bear the costs of
proving that it should be higher, the Court forces creditors to accept a
rate that does not fairly compensate them for the risks they must
bear.
B. The Presumptive ContractRate Approach
1. Basic Operation
The presumptive contract rate approach, endorsed by Justice
Scalia in his dissenting opinion, also recognizes that in order to
comply with the Bankruptcy Code, a secured creditor receiving a
stream of payments as part of a cram down plan should be
compensated for the risk of default.11 5 The contract rate method,
however, begins with the presumption that the contractual rate the
lender and debtor originally agreed upon properly compensates the
lender for that risk." 6 This contractual rate only operates as a
rebuttable presumption, however, and either party can present
evidence that relates to the riskiness of the payments in an attempt to
have a different rate applied. 117 In general, evidence bearing on "(1)
the probability of plan failure; (2) the rate of collateral depreciation;

112. See id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "risk premiums, if properly
computed, would typically be substantial" and noting that if the 21% contractual rate in Till is
an accurate reflection of risk in this case, the risk premium of 13% would represent nearly twothirds of the total interest rate).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 500 ("[Ihe costs of conducting a detailed risk analysis and defending it in
court are prohibitively high in relation to the amount at stake in most consumer loan cases.").
115. See id. at 491 (noting that the dissent and plurality "agree that any deferred payments
to a secured creditor must fully compensate it for the risk that [a default] will occur").
116. Id. at 492.
117. Id.
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(3) the liquidity of the collateral market; and (4) the administrative
expenses of enforcement" would be relevant to calculating a new
rate.118
The presumptive contract rate approach requires two very
important assumptions.
First, this approach only works if the
subprime lending market is efficient. 119 If the market is efficient and
therefore competitive, then the rates that the subprime lending
market charges consumer borrowers should consist only of the riskfree rate, the risk premium, and a small amount for transaction
costs. 120 If, on the other hand, the subprime lending markets are not
efficient, then the rates consumers are charged on their loans might
represent more than just an amount necessary to compensate the
lender for its risk (e.g., extra "interest" that represents pure profit).1 21
Therefore, only if the market is competitive will the contractual rate
represent an accurate estimate of the risk premium that the debtor
should be charged. 122
The second major assumption of the contract rate approach is
that the expected costs of default in Chapter 13 would be roughly the
same as they were at the time of the original loan.1 23 The expected
costs depend on both the likelihood of plan failure and the expected
recovery rate for the secured creditor in the event of default.1 24 In
Justice Scalia's dissent, he acknowledges that there is uncertainty
about both of these factors because of a lack of relevant empirical
118. Id. at 499.
119. See id. at 492 (stating that the contract-rate approach "assumes that subprime lending
markets are competitive and therefore largely efficient"). Although most often discussed in the
context of publicly-traded securities' prices, a market's efficiency is generally a measure of how
close existing prices are to the prices that would be in place if all of the relevant actors had
access to the same information. Cf. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 99 (4th ed. 2004).
A workable definition of an efficient market focuses on the relationship between price
and information. A security's price can be seen as being established in an efficient
market if, with respect to specific information, the price that exists for the security is
the same as the price it would have if everyone had the same information.

Id.
120. See Till, 541 U.S. at 492 (asserting that if the subprime lending markets are efficient,
"the high interest rates lenders charge reflect not extortionate profits or excessive costs, but the
actual risks of default that subprime borrowers present").
121. Id. at 481-82 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (arguing that the existing regulation of
subprime lending "evinces regulators' belief that unregulated subprime lenders would exploit
borrowers' ignorance and charge rates above what a competitive market would allow").
122. See id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (conceding that the contractual rate would not
provide a "reasonably accurate standard" if the subprime lending markets were not "competitive
and therefore largely efficient").
123. Id. at 492-93.
124. See id. at 503-04 (calculating the expected costs by multiplying the chance of failure by
the total costs in the event of default).
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data.125
In light of this uncertainty, however, he endorses the
presumptive contract rate method because as a practical matter, he
believes that the contractual rate is a better estimate of the
appropriate risk premium than the prime rate of interest, which only
incorporates a low level of risk.126
2. The Case for the Presumption Approach
The main reason that the dissenting Justices endorsed the
presumptive contract rate approach in lieu of the other methods is
that they believed it provided the most realistic means of enforcing the
goals of the Code. 127 This perception is based on the notion that the
promised stream of payments that comprise the cram down plan will
only be worth the entire amount of the allowed claim if the plan
provides for a risk premium that is large enough to wholly cover the
risk that the debtor will default again.' 28 Furthermore, calculating
the exact risk and expected recovery rate in any single case in order to
come up with an appropriate risk premium might be more expensive
than the actual claim itself, so the best source for reaching a
conclusion as to the appropriate risk premium is not the bankruptcy
court, but the financial markets. Determining the market rate for
these loans is complicated by the fact that unlike in Chapter 11, where
a market exists for loans made to debtors-in-possession, there is no
real market for loans to Chapter 13 debtors. 29 Therefore, according to
this method, the best available indication of the market rate for
130
Chapter 13 debtors is the rate that they agreed to in the first place.
According to Justice Scalia, another benefit of the presumptive
contract rate approach is that since this rate will generally provide a
good estimate of the appropriate risk premium, disputes between the

125. Id. at 493 & n.1 (noting that very few empirical studies on the success rates of Chapter
13 plans have been completed).
126. See id. at 504 (arguing that the "1.5% premium adopted in this case is far below
anything approaching fair compensation").
127. See id. at 508 ("Because I read the statute to require full risk compensation, and
because I would adopt a valuation method that has a realistic prospect of enforcing that
directive, I respectively dissent.").
128. See id. at 504 (arguing that the 1.5% premium adopted by the plurality falls short of
compensating the creditor for the full amount of default risk it is being forced to bear).
129. See, e.g., id. at 476 n.14 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
[W]hen picking a cramdown rate in a Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to ask
what rate an efficient market would produce. In the Chapter 13 context, by contrast,
the absence of any such market obligates courts to... ask only what rate will fairly
compensate a creditor for its exposure.

Id.
130. Id. at 491-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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debtor and creditors on this issue will be relatively rare.13 1 In fact,
because the parties have already agreed to the rate at least once
before, it is likely that they will be willing to accept the rate again,
thus streamlining the bankruptcy process by eliminating the
evidentiary hearing in most cases. In fact, the only time that there
would need to be an evidentiary hearing is if either party had
compelling evidence that the default risk or expected costs of default
were significantly different from when they first entered into the
contract, a rare occurrence according to the dissent. 132
In a related vein, the dissent also seems to have endorsed this
method because of the belief that the formula approach systematically
under-compensates creditors. 3 3 As a practical matter, if a debtor
posed enough of a risk of default before he or she declared bankruptcy
to make a 17% risk premium appropriate, 3 4 it is virtually certain that
after the debtor initiates bankruptcy proceedings the appropriate risk
premium would generate a cram down rate at least equal to the
35
original contractual rate.
Justice Scalia also argued that the Till issue does not force the
Court to choose between one method that always provides too low of
36
an estimate and another that consistently guesses too high.1
Instead, the choice between the methods is, according to him, one
between a rate that is obviously too low and one that is almost always
going to be within an acceptable range. 3 7 Furthermore, the danger of
selecting the method which results in a rate that is always too low is
that in many cases the amounts in dispute will be small enough that it
138 If
will not be financially feasible for the creditors to fight the issue.
secured creditors are systematically undercompensated, they will have
to make adjustments in their lending policies to other subprime
borrowers. These adjustments will take the form of even higher rates
or, in states where the rates are already limited by law, fewer loans
131. Id. at 492.
132. See id. (arguing that if the contract rate is adopted, "disputes should be infrequent, and
it will provide a quick and reasonably accurate standard").
133. Id. at 491-92.
134. This premium was calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate at the time the Tills
borrowed (approximately 4.13%) from the contractual rate of 21%.
135. Liz Pulliam Weston, Beef up Your Credit Score in 5 Steps, MSN MONEY, Oct. 2, 2005,
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Banking/Yourcreditrating/P38052.asp
(explaining that
bankruptcy is the "nuclear bomb of the credit world" as it "can knock 200 points, or more, off the
score of someone with otherwise good credit").
136. Till, 541 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 491-92.
138. See id. at 500 (arguing that the plurality's approach smacks of policymaking because
the "costs of conducting a detailed risk analysis and defending it in court are prohibitively high
in relation to the amount at stake in most consumer loan cases").
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will be made to similarly situated borrowers. 139 As Justice Scalia
noted, "widespread access to credit is worth preserving, even if it
140
means being ungenerous to sympathetic debtors."'
3. Criticisms
The fundamental problem with the presumptive contract rate
approach is that it assumes a very high rate of interest is appropriate
without any quantitative support for this conclusion.' 4 ' Although the
expected rate and costs of default could be similar in pre- and postbankruptcy scenarios, the Court in Till did not have enough
information to know whether that is actually the case. 42 For
example, although Justice Scalia discussed the possible default rates
for Chapter 13 plans, he never discussed the Tills' expected default
rate at the time they took out the original loan."43 Thus, there is no
basis for comparison. As a result, although Justice Scalia used the
37% rate of failure that the Tills provided for the sake of his example,
the opinion did not provide any way of actually knowing whether that
rate was higher or lower than the default rate Instant Auto Finance
expected at the time it made the loan. Without any actual information
on this point, the dissent's adoption of this method seems to be more of
a guess in favor of secured creditors than a reasoned conclusion.
The second basic problem with the contract rate approach is
that it puts the burden of proof on the debtor in the majority of cases.
As Justice Stevens pointed out, any information that is not already
included in the bankruptcy filings which have been prepared by the
debtor's representative is almost certainly more available to the
creditor, which must have the information in order to stay competitive
within its market. 44 If the debtor must, as a practical matter under
this approach, always be the party that presents evidence in an

139. See id. at 508 ("If subprime lenders are systematically undercompensated in
bankruptcy, they will charge higher rates or, if they already charge the legal maximum under
state law, lend to fewer of the riskiest borrowers.").
140. Id.
141. See Craig Rankin & Christopher Alliotts, The Importance of 'Till', NAT'L L.J., Sept. 6,
2004, at 13, 13 ("[Tjhe contract rate approach appears to be somewhat draconian when applied to
the debtors in Till.").
142. See Till, 541 U.S. at 504 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (admitting that "many of the estimates
[the dissenting opinion has] made can be disputed" but arguing that "[w]hen a risk premium is
off by an order of magnitude, one's estimates need not be very precise to show that it cannot
possibly be correct").
143. See generally id. at 491-508 (utilizing the risk premium incorporated in the contractual
rate as a basis of comparison without discussing the corresponding default rate).
144. Id. at 484 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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attempt to lower the interest rate, 14 5 the resources expended to do so
will come at the expense of unsecured creditors who already receive an
incredibly small percentage of their claims.
A final criticism of the presumptive contract rate approach is
that the dissent's assumption that the subprime lending market is
competitive and therefore largely efficient 146 is questionable. First, if
subprime borrowers had any real bargaining power (as they generally
would in a competitive market) it would be difficult to explain why
several states have found it necessary to enact usury laws limiting the
maximum amount of interest creditors can charge.1 4 7 The most
obvious explanation for these laws is that the state legislatures
believed that lenders in the subprime lending markets "would exploit
borrowers' ignorance and charge rates above what a competitive
market would allow" if left unregulated. 148 Justice Scalia's response to
this argument is that the subprime market must be competitive
because subprime lenders are twice as likely to be unprofitable as
prime lenders, and he cited a study to illustrate this point. 149 There
are two primary problems with this conclusion, however. First, other
research has reached the opposite result, namely that subprime
150
lenders actually tend to be more profitable than prime lenders.
Second, the tie between expected revenues and bottom-line profits is
more complicated than Justice Scalia implies, and subprime lenders'
tendency to be unprofitable could be explained in a multitude of other
ways. 15 1 Finally, Justice Scalia's argument that relying on the
efficiency of the subprime lending market is no more of a stretch than
relying on the efficiency of the prime market is unconvincing because
the two markets operate in substantially different ways. For example,

145. Creditors would not usually challenge the rate calculated by this method for two
reasons: (1) they would know that getting an even higher rate would be extremely unlikely; and
(2) they have already accepted the rate as compensation for the risk of nonpayment previously,
and although it might not be completely accurate considering the unique risks of the bankruptcy
plan failing, it will almost always be enough to make the creditor acquiesce.
146. Till, 541 U.S. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. See, e.g., id. at 482 n.22 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (listing examples of usury laws).
148. Id. at 482.
149. Id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. See Deanna Thompson, Subprime Not Necessarily Sub Profits, Bus. J., Oct. 6, 2000,
available at http://www.bizjournals.comtriadstories/2000/10/09/focus2.html?jst=ss hl (noting
that although prime banks were traditionally hesitant to enter the subprime lending market,
interest suddenly spiked when they discovered that margins were in the neighborhood of nine
percent).
151. For example, subprime lenders might tend to be smaller, less-established companies
that were quickly formed to take advantage of the incredibly favorable interest rate conditions of
the early 2000s. If this were the case, it would not be surprising that many of them were not
particularly well-run and became unprofitable when the interest rate environment changed.
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the prime rate of interest is published daily in many national
newspapers so it would be extremely difficult for any prime rate
lender to charge more than the market rate without the borrower
knowing. 15 2 On the other hand, the market rate for subprime
consumer borrowers is a much more fact-specific calculation that
incorporates, among other factors, the borrower's credit rating,
income, and other debts.153 As a result, it is not as easy for consumers
to compare the interest rate they are offered to what other similarly
situated consumers are receiving.
IV. SECURITIZATION DATA: WHAT DO THE NUMBERS SAY?

A. Till Addresses the Wrong Problem
As previously discussed, the formula and presumptive contract
rate approaches, as well as the Supreme Court opinions endorsing
them, remain unconvincing for many reasons. 154 In the aftermath of
Till, a majority of legal academics remain split along the same lines
they were previously. In fact, many of the articles written about Till
basically assert that the case failed to decide anything. 55 As a
practical matter, there is little hope that a resolution of this tension
will ever be possible if the issue continues to be framed as a choice
between the two approaches discussed in Part III of this Note. This
concern serves as the impetus for this Note's thesis, which is that both
the Till opinions and the ongoing debate about these methods start
with the wrong question.
Further discussion of this issue should begin with the
determination of whether using the educated guess methods analyzed
in Till is even necessary. The goal in all of this is to calculate the

152. See, e.g., Money Rates, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2005, at B5 (listing the prime rate, "[t]he
base rate on corporate loans posted by at least 75% of the nation's largest 30 banks," as 5.5%,
effective 2/2/05).
153. See Wells Fargo, What Lenders Consider, http://www.wellsfargo.comlcreditcenter/
use-creditbuy-home/lendersconsider?_requestid=79485 (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (noting that
consumer lenders base decisions on five factors: "income stability, the debt-to-income ratio, the
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, property appraisal, and credit history.").
154. See discussion supra Part III.
155. See, e.g., Brubaker, supra note 32, at 1 ("[T]here is little in Till to guide and constrain
the lower courts, aside from the pre-Till circuit precedent not inconsistent with Till."); Yerbich,
supra note 13, at 10 (noting that although Till will most likely be interpreted by lower courts as
setting the prime rate as the starting point, the actual impact still hinges on the risk premium
adjustment, "and on this point, Till provides no assistance whatsoever. Indeed, Till does not
even tell uswho has the burden!").
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present value of a stream of future payments. 156 Unless one is
prepared to challenge fundamental financial principles, the discount
rate calculation should be simply a function of the risk-free rate and
157
an appropriate risk premium for the specific loan in question.
Outside of bankruptcy, this type of calculation takes place millions of
times a day. Lenders have developed scoring systems which estimate
the risks that individual borrowers pose by comparing their
characteristics to those of past borrowers who have defaulted. This
simple observation begs the question: why is the Supreme Court
arguing over whether the contractual rate or the prime rate is a more
accurate guess instead of just trying to calculate the appropriate rate,
158
which should be a function of the plan's risk?
. The most likely response to this question is that conducting
such an analysis would be prohibitively expensive due to the dearth of
information on the success rates of Chapter 13 bankruptcy plans, as
well as the lack of public information about the success rates of loans
made outside of bankruptcy. 159 Therefore, some would argue that the
bankruptcy courts simply must use the best estimate available instead
1 60
of trying to calculate the risk premium on a case-by-case basis.
Furthermore, proponents of the Till methods claim that unnecessary
unfairness is avoided due to the fact that either party can introduce
161
evidence as to an appropriate adjustment to the presumed rate.

156. See Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 957 (1997).
Under the cram down option, the debtor is permitted to keep the property over the
objection of the creditor; the creditor retains the lien securing the claim ... , and the
debtor is required to provide the creditor with payments, over the life of the plan, that
will total the present value of the allowed secured claim.
Id. (citation omitted).
157. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
(explaining that the components of the prime rate include a charge "for the opportunity costs of
the loan, the risk of inflation, and the relatively slight risk of default").
158. For those who would disagree with this characterization of the Till debate, the plurality
is refusing to calculate the likelihood of success which is absolutely necessary to figure out if the
risk premium is appropriate, and the dissent is using a rate that represents the likely success of
the original loan instead of the bankruptcy plan.
159. See, e.g., Till, 541 U.S. at 477, 479 (Stevens, J. plurality opinion) (criticizing approaches
that attempt to determine comparable market rates as being "complicated" and "impos[ing]
significant evidentiary costs" and claiming that one of the virtues of the formula approach is that
it "minimizes the need for potentially costly additional evidentiary proceedings"); id. at 480
(admitting that "[t]here is some dispute about the true scale" of the risk that the plan will fail).
160. See id. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (framing the dispute between the Till dissent and
plurality as being over "what procedure will more often produce accurate estimates of the
appropriate interest rate") (emphasis added).
161. See id. at 479 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("The court must therefore hold a hearing
at which the debtor and any creditors may present evidence about the appropriate risk
adjustment."); id. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If a judge thinks it necessary to modify the rate
to avoid unjustified disparity, he can do so.").
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In the end, some or all of the above assertions may be true.
However, considering the stakes involved, these contentions should
not be accepted without scrutiny. The Till debate up to this point
seems to have accepted these conclusions as gospel, which is why the
remainder of Part IV lays out some of the available information and
takes a hard look at whether calculating risk premiums in
bankruptcies would be plausible, or, alternatively, whether there is
enough information to at least test the accuracy of the educated guess
methods used in Till.
B. Gatheringthe Available Data
The problem inherent in calculating the appropriate risk
premium actually results from two separate dilemmas. First, in spite
of the fact that there have been millions of Chapter 13 cases, there is
very little empirical data on the historical success and recovery rates
for such plans. 162 If such information were available, calculating the
appropriate risk premium for any given Chapter 13 plan could be
analogous to how such a premium would be calculated outside of
bankruptcy.
The second informational problem is the perceived lack of
available data about success and recovery rates for loans made outside
of bankruptcy. Even if the historical results of Chapter 13 plans were
not available, this second kind of data would enable bankruptcy courts
to compare loan situations that were sufficiently analogous to the de
facto loan at issue and thus generate an estimate of the going market
rate for such a loan.
The resort to the presumptive contract rate and formula
approaches is strong evidence that courts dealing with this issue have
concluded that neither of the above kinds of information is obtainable
in sufficient quantities. However, while the existing empirical data
about Chapter 13 plans leaves much to be desired, there is a
significant amount of available information concerning loans made
outside of bankruptcy that could be extremely useful in a risk
premium analysis.
A plentiful source of such information can be found in the
securitization industry, which has surprisingly been ignored by
previous courtroom and academic discussions of the Till issue. To
securitize is to "convert (assets) into negotiable securities for resale in

162. See, e.g., id. at 485 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (describing the data uncovered by the
dissent as "rather sketchy"); id. at 493 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the two available
empirical studies on the success rates of confirmed Chapter 13 plans).
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the financial market." 163 One of the most common types of assets to
securitize is loans generated by financial institutions, a large portion
of which are consumer automobile loans. 164 In fact, institutions such
as General Motors Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC") and Capital One
Auto Finance securitize pools made up entirely of either prime or
subprime consumer automobile loans. 165 Although it is still a
relatively new development in the world of finance, securitization has
become a useful tool for many companies and an absolute staple in
166
certain industries.
Securitization data is relevant to this analysis because these
pools of loans are being converted into securities for public sale, and,
as a result, information must be filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC").167 As part of the required SEC
disclosures, the issuing companies divulge the historical losses and
delinquency rates of loans similar to those which make up the
collateral. As will be seen in the next Section, this information

163. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1358 (7th ed. 1999).

In a typical securitization transaction, the company originating, or sponsoring, the
transaction (hereinafter, the "originator") sells rights to payment from incomeproducing financial assets, such as accounts receivable, loans, or lease rentals
(collectively, "financial assets"), to a special-purpose entity or vehicle-variously
referred to as an "SPE" or "SPV" (this article uses the latter term)-which in turn
transfers such rights to a second SPV. The second SPV issues securities to capital
market investors and uses the proceeds of the issuance to pay the first SPV for the
financial assets; the first SPV then uses those proceeds to pay the originator. The
investors in the securities are repaid from collections of the financial assets. They
therefore buy the securities based on their assessments of the value of the financial
assets. The relationship between the originator and the investors is arm's length and
independent.
Steven L. Schwarcz, SecuritizationPost-Enron,25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1540 (2004).
164. See, e.g., FITCH RATINGS, A ROAD MAP TO RATING AUTO LOAN-BACKED SECURITIZATIONS

1 (2002), availableat http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/report frame.cfm?rpt-id=139
756&sector-flag-'l&marketsector=2&detail= ("Since the inception of the asset-backed securities
(ABS) market, auto-backed securitization has been a vital part of total ABS volume.").
165. See, e.g., FITCH RATINGS, AUTO-BACKED ABS: 2003 REVIEW AND 2004 OUTLOOK 13, 15

(2004), available at http://www.fitchratings.comlcorporate/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt-id=195
304&sector flag-l&marketsector=2&detail= [hereinafter AUTO-BACKED ABS] (charting the
cumulative losses of ABS securitizations issued by GMAC (prime) and Capital One (subprime)).
166. See Schwarcz, supra note 163, at 1541.
Securitization has unquestionable benefits. It enables the originator to obtain lowercost financing through disintermediation by removing the need for intermediaries,
such as banks, that separate the originator from the ultimate source of funds, the
capital markets. It increases liquidity and better allocates risk and its distribution. It
also enables the originator to "deploy scarce and costly capital to other portions of its
business that may be in need of it." To this extent, at least, it is viewed as socially
desirable.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
167. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2006) (prohibiting the sale or delivery of securities unless a
registration statement covering the securities is in effect).
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provides interesting comparisons for the Chapter 13 risk premium
analysis.
C. Presentationof the Findings
In order to avoid data skewed by abnormal securitization
issues in favor of information representative of the subprime and
prime consumer automobile lending markets generally, more than one
hundred securitizations of automobile loans were reviewed for this
Note. In the end, twenty-six prime and twenty-seven subprime
securitization issues were selected. 168 Each issue discussed in this
168. All of the following prospectuses are available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml. Prime
securitizations selected for this Note are as follows: Chase Manhattan Auto Owner Trust 2003-B,
Prospectus (Form 424b), at S-14 (July 25, 2003); Chase Manhattan Auto Owner Trust 2003-A,
Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-14 (May 27, 2003); Chase Manhattan Auto Owner Trust 2002-B,
Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-14 (June 4, 2002); Chase Manhattan Auto Owner Trust 2002-A,
Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-14 (Mar. 4, 2002); Chase Manhattan Auto Owner Trust 2001-B,
Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-15 (Nov. 5, 2001); Chase Manhattan Auto Owner Trust 2001-A,
Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-13 (July 19, 2001); Chase Manhattan Auto Owner Trust 2000-A,
Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-14 (Dec. 6, 2000); DaimlerChrysler Auto Trust 2003-B, Prospectus
(Form 424b5), at S-7 (Dec. 2, 2003); DaimlerChrysler Auto Trust 2003-A, Prospectus (Form
424b5), at S-7 (Aug. 19, 2003); DaimlerChrysler Auto Trust 2002-B, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at
S-7 (Aug. 22, 2002); DaimlerChrysler Auto Trust 2002-A, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-7 (Aug.
8, 2002); DaimlerChrysler Auto Trust 2001-B, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-7 (June 4, 2001);
Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2003-B, Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-7 (Mar. 26, 2003); Ford
Credit Auto Owner Trust 2003-A, Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-7 (Mar. 26, 2003); Ford Credit
Auto Owner Trust 2002-D, Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-7 (June 13, 2002); Ford Credit Auto
Owner Trust 2002-C, Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-7 (June 13, 2002); Ford Credit Auto Owner
Trust 2002-B, Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-7 (Mar. 12, 2002); Honda Auto Receivables 2003-4
Owner Trust, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-23 (Oct. 29, 2003); Honda Auto Receivables 2003-3
Owner Trust, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-23 (Aug. 19, 2003); Honda Auto Receivables 2003-1
Owner Trust, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-23 (Feb. 24, 2003); Honda Auto Receivables 2002-4
Owner Trust, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-23 (Nov. 18, 2002); Honda Auto Receivables 2002-3
Owner Trust, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-23 (July 18, 2002); Honda Auto Receivables 2002-2
Owner Trust, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-23 (May 17, 2002); Honda Auto Receivables 2002-1
Owner Trust, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-23 (Jan. 25, 2002); Honda Auto Receivables 2001-3
Owner Trust, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-23 (Oct. 16, 2001); Honda Auto Receivables 2001-2
Owner Trust, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-22 (July 20, 2001). Subprime securizations selected
for this Note are as follows: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2003-D-M, Prospectus
(Form 424b5), at S-22 (July 10, 2003); AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2003-C-F,
Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-19 (July 10, 2003); AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust
2003-B-X, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-19 (Jan. 25, 2003); AmeriCredit Automobile
Receivables Trust 2003-A-M, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-19 (Jan. 25, 2003); AmeriCredit
Automobile Receivables Trust 2002-E-M, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-19 (Jan. 25, 2002);
AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2002-D, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-20 (Jan. 25,
2002); Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2003-B, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-17 (Nov. 4, 2003);
Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2003-A, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-17 (May 14, 2003);
Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2002-C, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-15 (Dec. 2, 2002); Capital
One Auto Finance Trust 2002-B, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-16 (June 14, 2002); Capital One
Auto Finance Trust 2002-A, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-13 (Apr. 15, 2002); Capital One Auto
Finance Trust 2001-B, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-15 (Dec. 11, 2001); Capital One Auto
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Note was picked for two primary reasons: (1) the securitization's
prospectus was available on the SEC's website; and (2) the selected
issues were included in Fitch Rating's industry-wide index for such
securitizations. 16 9 The data garnered from this research includes the
average annual percentage rates, default rates, terms, and net losses
of the consumer automobile loans that make up the asset pool. The
information is laid out in Tables 1 and 2, below.

Table 1: Data from 2000-2003 Prime Securitizations

Honda

Chase

DaimlerChrysler

Ford

5.80

7.17

6.60

5.58

1.17

2.06

2.42

3.12

56.63

58.31

59.39

56.46

0.32

0.55

0.92

1.53

72.54

73.58

62.12

50.96

Weighted
Averave.

Issues
Average
APR (%)
Rate of
Default (%)
Average
Term
(Months)
Loss Rate

(%)

Calc. Rec.
Rate (%)

Finance Trust 2001-A, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-12 (July 10, 2001); Household Automotive
Trust 2003-2, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-17 (Oct. 28, 2003); Household Automotive Trust
2003-1, Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-17 (May 27, 2003); Household Automotive Trust 2002-3,
Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-17 (Nov. 25, 2002); Household Automotive Trust 2002-2,
Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-15 (Aug. 26, 2002); Household Automotive Trust 2002-1,
Prospectus (Form 424b5), at S-15 (May 29, 2002); Household Automotive Trust 2001-3,
Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-15 (Oct. 19, 2001); Household Automotive Trust 2001-2,
Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-14 (July 19, 2001); Household Automotive Trust 2001-1,
Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-11 (Mar. 2, 2001); Household Automotive Trust VI Series 2000-3,
Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-11 (Aug. 31, 2000); Household Automotive Trust V Series 2000-2,
Prospectus (Form 424b2), at S-10 (June 15, 2000); Triad Automobile Receivables Trust 2004-A,
Prospectus (Form 425b5), at S-16 (Mar. 15, 2004); Triad Automobile Receivables Trust 2003-B,
Prospectus (Form 425b5), at S-14 (Oct. 27, 2003); Triad Automobile Receivables Trust 2003-A,
Prospectus (Form 425b5), at S-14 (Mar. 26, 2003); Triad Automobile Receivables Trust 2002-A,
Prospectus (Form 425b2), at S-13 (Aug. 19, 2002).
169. See AUTO-BACKED ABS, supra note 165, at 12-16 (providing charts that display the
performance of these securitizations during 2003).
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Table 2: Data from 2000-2003 Subprime Securitizations
Capital

I

Weighted

AmeriCredit

One

Household

Triad

6

7

10

4

16.60

15.24

17.47

16.99

11.43

9.49

12.21

13.40

(Months)

63.67

63.29

63.96

66.22

Loss Rate (%)

4.25

4.85

6.02

6.15

50.72

54.10

Issues

Averages
1.

Average APR

(%)
Rate of Default

(%)
Average Term

Calc. Rec. Rate

(%)

62.80

1 48.89

1!

:i 1

I

As can be seen from the above tables, the weighted average
default rate for prime consumer automobile loans is 2.02%, and the
same rate for subprime consumers is 11.51%. These percentages are
not reported directly in every one of the SEC filings used for this
analysis. In fact, in half of the issues studied here (those by Ford,
Chase, AmeriCredit, and Triad), the disclosures included the number
of delinquent contracts over the total number of contracts outstanding,
which is what this analysis uses as the rate of default.17 0 However, in
the other half of the issues (those by Honda, DaimlerChrysler, Capital
One, and Household Finance), the information only included the
average annual amount of past due payments (both principal and
interest) divided by the average outstanding principal. 7 1 While this
number is conceptually different than the rate of default, review of the
SEC disclosures that contain both types of data reveals that on
average this number is only about 6.65% lower than the rate of
default.17 2 Therefore, for the second four securitization issuances, the
delinquency rates provided were adjusted upwards by 6.65%. As one
can see from looking at Tables 1 and 2, this small adjustment left the
corresponding default rates within the range of those for which direct
numbers were disclosed.

170. See sources cited supra note 168.
171. Id.
172. Id. Expressing default percentages in these two different ways (defaulted contracts
versus defaulted principal) does not result in wildly different outcomes because the loan amounts
for these securitizations do not vary significantly.
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The last lines of Tables 1 and 2 must also be explained in more
detail. In order to present data that has any real explanatory power,
one needs the average recovery rate in the event of default, a number
which is not disclosed directly in any of the SEC filings used in this
analysis. 173 However, the filings do disclose the number that is listed
in the second to last line in Tables 1 and 2, which is the net loss rate.
This number is the percentage of outstanding principal that must be
written off on a yearly basis, net of recoveries from prior write-offs. In
order to calculate the average recovery rate using this information,
this analysis makes the reasonable assumption that the net loss rate
is simply a function of the default rate multiplied by the average loss
in the event of default. Therefore, the average recovery rate used in
this analysis was calculated using the following formula:
(1 - p)*(1 - y) = NLR

1 74

"NLR" represents the net loss rate discussed above (which is
given in the filings), "(1 - p)" is the probability of default, and "(1 - y)"
represents the expected loss in the event of default, where "y" itself is
equal to the expected recovery rate. The results of this calculation for
the data presented are located in the last row of both Tables.
D. A Different Kind of FormulaApproach
In order to explain the relationship and relevance of the data
presented in the previous Section to the issue in Till, the following
formula will be used to demonstrate, on a very simple level, how
different rates of default and expected losses affect the appropriate
risk premium:
E(r) = (p) (1 + k) + (1 - p)*y175

"E(r)" is the expected return on a loan in which "k" is equal to
the total interest rate charged to the borrower. "(1 - p)" and 'y'
173. Id.
174. As net loss rate includes both losses for the year and recoveries from previously written
off accounts, it is not as helpful for explanatory purposes in this analysis. Therefore, the formula
presented here is simply another way of expressing the same number, that is, as a matter of
basic algebra, the overall loss rate for the year must be a function of the probability of default
multiplied by the average loss in the event of default. As the add-backs of previously written off
accounts are generally negligible, this analysis assumes that they are constant on a yearly basis
and therefore does not separately take them into account, but rather leaves them incorporated
into the overall net loss rate.
175. As was the case with the previous formula, this is simply a statement of basic algebraic
principles, that is, the expected return from a loan in a simple two-state world (assuming there is
only one payment period and only two possible outcomes) is simply the probability of the first
outcome multiplied by the result of that outcome plus the probability of the second outcome
multiplied by the result of that outcome.
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represent the same concepts they did in the previously explained
formula. 176 Again, this formula simply represents the expected return
given the probabilities of the two possible outcomes; therefore, it
177
makes several simplifying assumptions.
E. Application of the Collected Data
In order to see how well the above formula performs in
explaining the relationship between default rates, expected losses
assuming default, and default risk premiums, the data collected and
explained in Section C will be used to calculate a predicted risk
premium for the prime and subprime automobile loans.
This
prediction will then be compared to the actual average annual
percentage rate of the loans within the securitizations that is reported
in the SEC filings. As was mentioned previously, the equation makes
several simplifying assumptions, the most notable of which is that
there is only one payment period. Therefore, even though the
calculation will use interest rates that are applicable to multi-year
loans, to keep calculations as simple as possible, it assumes that there
is only one period. The predicted risk premiums for the prime and
subprime loans are contained in Table 4, below:
Table 3: Rates Used in the Calculations
Dec-00

Dec-01

Dec-02

Dec-03

Averages

5.35

3.11

1.84

1.91

3.05

Treasury Rate

5.17

4.39

3.03

3.27

3.97

Prime Rate

9.50

4.84

4.25

4.00

5.65

2-Year
Treasury Rate

5-Year

176. See supra Part IV.C.
177. While these assumptions should not be ignored, the purpose of this Note is not to
incorporate every possible variable, but rather to provide an understandable example of how
securitization data could be added to the cram down mix in order to come up with a more
accurate method of calculating risk premiums.
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Table 4: Results of Applying the Probabilities Formula: Predicted Risk
Premiums
Prime (%)

Subprime (%)

W.A. Rate of Default
W.A. Recovery Rate
App. Risk-Free
Predicted Rate

2.02
65.75
3.97
4.75

11.51
53.43
3.97
10.53

Predicted Risk Prem.

.79

6.57

Average APR
Unpredicted Premium

6.28
1.53

16.63
6.09

As Table 4 demonstrates, using the information collected from
the SEC filings and the appropriate risk-free rate of interest as the
expected return, the formula predicted a contractual rate of 4.75% for
prime auto loans and 10.53% for those that are subprime. When
compared to the average five-year treasury rate over the same time
period, these predicted rates would provide creditors with a .78% risk
premium for prime loans, and 6.56% for subprime loans.
As is apparent from Table 4, both sets of numbers are lower
than the average annual percentage rate of the loans that made up
the securitization asset pools. In the case of prime loans, Table 4
shows that the average rate of interest charged to prime borrowers is
approximately 1.5% higher than the predicted rate, and the average
rate charged to subprime borrowers is approximately 6.1% higher
than the rate predicted by the formula.
There are several possible explanations for these discrepancies.
The first potential explanation is that the equation being used in this
analysis, and its simplifying assumptions, creates a margin of error
that leads to systematically low risk premiums. However, an equally
plausible reason that the predicted rates are lower than the actual
rates charged to consumers is that the formula being used in this
analysis is only designed to calculate the premium necessary to
compensate creditors for default risk and does not take into account
other forms of risk, transaction costs, and profit margins, the
combination of which could make up the entire difference between the
rates. In other words, as far as the market for consumer automobile
loans is concerned, creditors will demand more than just
compensation for the time value of money (which would simply be the
risk-free rate). Furthermore, even the risk-free rate plus sufficient
compensation for the risk that the debtor could default will not be
enough (which would be the rate predicted by the formula). In fact,
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the market appears to require an extra 1.5%-6% of contractual
interest depending on the credit rating of the consumer to compensate
for things such as transaction costs, prepayment risk, reinvestment
risk, inflation risk, etc. The important lesson to take away from these
results is that if one simply applied the formula used in this analysis
to create the contractual rate of interest on a loan, he or she would, if
anything, undercompensate the creditor as compared to the going
market rate.
V. SOLUTION: CALCULATING CHAPTER 13 CRAM DOWN RATES
As was explained in Part III, the fundamental flaw in the
approaches endorsed by both the plurality and dissenting opinions in
Till is that they simply guess at the correct risk premiums in lieu of
providing quantitative support for their conclusions. 178 Both of the
opinions amounted to concessions that the true risk premiums for
Chapter 13 cram down plans could not be calculated. Thus, the real
dispute centered around what the presumption should be, even though
in most cases neither party would be able to present enough evidence
to change it. As a result, the Till issue simply must be revisited
because the educated guess approaches of both the plurality and
dissent simply do not comply with the Code.
A. ComparingData
Though not abundant, there certainly appears to be enough
information about the success rates of Chapter 13 bankruptcy plans to
know that both of the Till approaches have missed the mark. As both
the plurality and dissenting opinions note, there appears to be only
two studies that shed any light on how often confirmed Chapter 13
plans succeed. The first, referred to as the Girth study, yields a postconfirmation failure rate of 37%.179 Of course, the predictive value of
this number is somewhat questionable when one realizes that it is
over twenty years old and was calculated using data from a single
district. 80 The Norberg study also tackles the issue of Chapter 13
success rates, and while it is more recent, it also uses information that

178. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 491 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our only
disagreement is over what procedure will more often produce accurate estimates of the
appropriate interest rate.").
179. Id. at 493 n.1.
180. Id.
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is geographically limited.18 ' Nevertheless, the Norberg study yields a
post-confirmation failure rate of a whopping 60%.182
Although there is a need for further research in this area
before the debate can be settled for good, the numbers that are
available at this point clearly indicate that it is an extremely risky
proposition to rely on the success of a Chapter 13 plan. In fact, even
the lower of the two available Chapter 13 failure rates is three times
as high as the default rates for subprime automobile loans. This is
where the information presented in Part IV becomes particularly
helpful. One can discern from that data that an average default rate
of 11.51% and recovery rate of 53.43% yields an average risk premium
of 6.57% according to the simple probabilities formula. Furthermore,
and perhaps more importantly, the financial markets appear to
require a risk premium of 12.66% according to the average APR of the
subprime loans. Without any further calculation, it becomes clear
that Chapter 13 plans should require a risk premium that is greater
than that of the loans making up the subprime securitizations because
the bankruptcy failure rate is so much higher. At this point, it is
helpful to remember that the Till plurality confirmed a Chapter 13
bankruptcy plan with a risk premium of just 1.5%,183 an inexplicably
low number in light of the preceding observations.
To further
illustrate this point, Table 5 uses the formula presented in Part IV to
calculate the expected risk premium using the available Chapter 13
information.
Table 5: Applying the Probabilities Formula to Bankruptcy
Girth

Rate of Failure/Default
Assumed Recovery Rate
App. Risk-Free Rate
Calculated Rate
Risk Premium

(%)

37.00
53.43
5.35
35.84
30.49

Norberg

(%)

60.00
53.43
5.35
83.23
77.88

As Table 5 shows, even using the failure rate from the more
optimistic Girth study, the formula used in Part IV of this Note
predicts that in order to compensate a creditor for the default risk of a
Chapter 13 plan, the nominal rate of interest charged to the debtor
would have to be 35.84%! Of course, if that number seems high, using
181. Id.

182. Id.
183. Id. at 480 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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the data from the Norberg study results in what would seem to be an
outright absurd 83.23%.
What makes these results even more stunning is that they only
represent the rates necessary to compensate creditors for the default
risk of Chapter 13 plans. In order to get a true "market" rate for this
type of loan, one would have to add to these already unconscionable
rates at least a portion of the unpredicted premium discussed in Part
IV.
B. Implications
The above calculations have been presented simply to show the
inherent problem with the Supreme Court's attempt to comply with
the Bankruptcy Code by guessing at the appropriate risk premium.
Although these results could certainly be used to make the blanket
argument that Chapter 13 secured creditors are systematically
undercompensated, that is not the intention of this Note. In fact, if
the rates calculated above were actually applied, the simple reality is
that many debtors would find Chapter 13 to be prohibitively expensive
and therefore useless. This effect, in combination with the Act's
severe limitations on the availability of Chapter 7, could mean that
some consumer debtors would be left without any useful form of
bankruptcy relief, a result most agree would cause serious societal
problems.
Instead, the presentation of these findings constitutes an
attempt to show that there is enough information available to know
that the methods used in Till fail to comply with the Bankruptcy
Code. As was mentioned earlier, the primary reason bankruptcy
courts began using the Till methods was the perceived lack of
information regarding Chapter 13 success rates and the default and
recovery rates of loans made outside of bankruptcy. 8 4 The conclusion
that there is a lack of information about Chapter 13 plans was almost
certainly correct. As a result, it would be a mistake to simply use the
default rates from the two available empirical studies along with the
probabilities formula from Part IV to actually calculate the rate that
an individual debtor should have to pay to retain his assets. However,
the conclusion as to the lack of comparative data seems to have been
premature.
Using the information presented in Part IV as an
example, it appears obvious that despite the Till methods' appeal as
simplistic solutions, they are much too inaccurate to be accepted as a
necessary solution to the problem of how to calculate cram down rates.

184. See supra Part IV.A.
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Therefore, to appropriately settle the Till issue for good, one of
two things must happen: either a comprehensive study on the success
rates of confirmed Chapter 13 plans should be conducted or the
Bankruptcy Code should be amended. As to the comprehensive study
option, admittedly, there are major barriers to such a study being
accomplished. However, if the results were objectively verifiable, then
18 5
the analysis could be conducted by a number of different groups.
Upon the completion of such a study, bankruptcy courts would have
much more reliable estimates of default rates for Chapter 13 plans,
which would mean that the calculation of cram down rates in
bankruptcy could be as easy as applying the formula discussed in Part
IV. This type of study would also enable the bankruptcy courts to
evolve beyond using the simple formula presented in this analysis and
instead develop a scoring system for Chapter 13 debtors that would be
analogous to the systems that have been engineered by the credit
industry to assess the likelihood of default outside of bankruptcy.186
Although it would take time and probably require some trial and
error, such a system would allow courts to calculate the appropriate
risk premium for any given Chapter 13 plan. Such a calculation
process would reduce the need for evidentiary hearings as to the
appropriate risk premium in any single case, and would thus
streamline the bankruptcy process. Most importantly, however, this
type of calculation would reach a much more objective result than
those currently being used and would also avoid the problem of
systematically placing the burden of proof as to the correct rate on one
of the parties.
If it is determined that a study of Chapter 13 success rates is
not possible, then the bankruptcy courts that confirm Chapter 13
cram down plans will continue to violate the clear language of the
Bankruptcy Code until the Code itself is amended.18 7 The simple
financial fact is that if one does not know how risky a stream of future
payments is, the present value of those payments cannot be accurately
calculated. The Code's mandate that a cram down plan not be
confirmed unless the secured creditor receives at least the value of its
185. Examples of such groups include but are not limited to legislative committees, legal
academics, the credit industry, and debtor advocate groups.
186. See, e.g., MyFICO, How Credit Scoring Helps You, http://www.myfico.com/Credit
EducationlScoringHelps.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) ("Credit scores give lenders a fast,
objective measurement of your credit risk. Before the use of scoring, the credit granting process
could be slow, inconsistent and unfairly biased.").
187. Of course, the Code was amended in the spring of 2005, but this issue amazingly
escaped the attention of Congress. Although some would argue that the inaction by members of
Congress on this matter is a sign of implicit approval of the Till result, I counter that their
inaction was simply a result of their haste to satisfy their constituencies.
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secured claim 188 requires that the court know the present value of the
promised payments before confirmation. The fact that creditors and
debtors have the "opportunity" to present evidence that the risk
premium presumptions of the court are incorrect 18 9 does not solve the
problem because holding such an evidentiary hearing is, in most cases,
prohibitively expensive for either party. Therefore, if the success rates
of Chapter 13 plans cannot be calculated, the Code should reflect the
fact that creditors will not necessarily be receiving the full value of
their claim if they are required to accept a stream of future payments
in lieu of a lump-sum payment at the time of confirmation.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Till was faced with a split of opinion on
how to calculate discount rates for Chapter 13 cram down plans.
Without addressing the issue, the Court accepted the implicit
assumption of lower courts that calculation of risk premiums, and
therefore discount rates, was impossible on a case-by-case basis
because of the lack of necessary information. As a result, the Court
framed the issue as a choice between the methods used by lower
courts without truly addressing the possibility that they all fail to
comply with the Bankruptcy Code. Framed in this manner, it is not
surprising that the Justices ended up splitting four-four-one.
Furthermore, because Justice Thomas simply concurred with the
method that resulted in the lower risk premium in the specific case
before the Court, it is entirely possible that if the Court were to take
up the issue again the dissent and plurality could switch roles.
In the aftermath of the Till decision, there has been significant
academic commentary criticizing its outcome and arguing that one of
the Till methods should be adopted over the others. 190 This Note

breaks from that commentary by proposing that none of the Till
methods amounts to a viable solution. To further this point, this Note
utilizes loan data available in securitization disclosures as a basis of
comparison, which leads to two primary conclusions. First, while
188. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006) ("the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of
property to be distributed under the plan on account of such [allowed secured] claim is not less
than the allowed amount of such claim").
189. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
(stating that "the debtor and any creditors may present evidence about the appropriate risk
adjustment" at a hearing).
190. See Brubaker, supra note 32, at 1 ("there is little in Till to guide and constrain the lower
courts, aside from pre-Till circuit precedent not inconsistent with Till"); Yerbich, supra note 13,
at 10 (arguing that "[plurality pronouncements have long been the bane of lower federal courts
in attempting to apply them").
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case-by-case risk premium calculation is possible, the limited data
available at this point would make it hard to justify the sometimes
Second, in contrast to
draconian results it would produce.
assumptions made by the Till Court, there is enough data to
convincingly show that the educated guess methods debated in Till
are inaccurate enough to seriously question their compliance with the
Code.
As a result of these conclusions, the Till issue can be resolved
in one of two ways. First, comprehensive studies on the success rates
of Chapter 13 plans would enable bankruptcy courts to develop
objective formulas for calculating cram down rates. Alternatively, if
such studies are not possible, the Bankruptcy Code should be
amended to reflect the financial reality that bankruptcy courts are
currently confirming cram down plans without knowing whether
secured creditors are being properly compensated.
Matthew Henschen O'Brien
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